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Motivation
• Cyclicality exists in Commercial Aviation
• Cyclicality has repercussions across the enterprise ecosystem
• Lack of centralized control makes coordinated action to moderate 
cyclicality difficult
• Symbiotic strategies that can moderate cyclicality in a way beneficial to 
multiple stakeholders are not readily identifiable
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Overview & Methodology
Understanding key aspects of:
– Commercial Aviation 
– Business cycles in economics and supply chains 
– Enterprise modeling
Representing Commercial Aviation as Enterprise of Enterprises
(CA EoE) to identify leverage points, strategic alternatives 
and interests
Modeling of the CA EoE using System Dynamics
Testing strategic alternatives for effectiveness and 
implementability
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Key Finding
• If Boeing follows the Airbus aircraft delivery model 
then 
– BOTH the manufacturers (Boeing: +87%, Airbus: +55% 
total op. profit)
– AND the airline industry as a whole (Airline NPV: +20%) 
will enjoy increased profitability 
– WHILE passenger surplus will not be affected 
substantially (total passenger welfare may actually 
increase)
(Until 2025, one scenario, assuming no new entrants in the 
large commercial aircraft (>100 seats) category)
• More combinations of strategic alternatives 
(policies) improve on this performance!
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Research Questions
• How is cyclicality manifested in commercial aviation? What are 
the impacts from cyclicality in commercial aviation?
• What are the salient causal mechanisms that induce the 
cyclical behavior in commercial aviation?
• What are implementable strategic alternatives for dampening 
that cyclicality and what are their benefits?
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How is cyclicality manifested in commercial 
aviation? (I)
Æ Cyclical profitability for airlines
Æ Increasing amplitude post-deregulation
Global Airline 
profitability in $B
US Market Deregulation
Global Data – Data Sources: ATA (2006)
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How is cyclicality manifested in commercial 
aviation? (II)
Æ Correlation between GDP growth and travel demand 
Æ Bullwhip effect in aircraft orders
Growth Rates (%)
Global Data – Data Sources: ATA (2006), Boeing and Airbus Databases 
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How is cyclicality manifested in commercial 
aviation? (III)
Aircraft 
seats 
(‘000)
Boeing ORDERS
Boeing 
DELIVERIES
Global Data – Data Sources: Boeing and Airbus Databases
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Æ Different Aircraft Production Strategies: Boeing and Airbus 
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What are the impacts from cyclicality in 
commercial aviation?
• Low industry-wide return on invested capital
• Periodic overcapacity and constrained capacity of aircraft:
– Hire fire cycles. Airport and ATC planning. Inconsistent LOS and
fares.
• Periodic overcapacity and constrained capacity of 
manufacturing resources:
– Hire/fire cycles. Production efficiency deterioration. Labor/mgt
relations.
Source: Pope and Nyhan 2002
‘000 Boeing 
employees
$2.6B write-off and 8% overnight stock value loss (Boeing) (Newhouse 2006)
$3.7B requested assistance
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What are the salient causal mechanisms that induce the cyclical 
behavior?  From business cycle literature
• Triggers:
– Macroeconomic cycle
– Input variability
• Psychological Factors
– Bounded Rationality (Metzler 1941, Abramovitz 1950, Lucas 1975) 
– Supply chain discounting (Sterman 1989, Croson et al 2004, 2006)
– Investment exuberance, risk tolerance and strategic optimism (Pigou 1929, Krainer 2003)
• Industry Structure
– Imperfect financing and capital market volatility (Carpenter et al. 1994, Bernanke and Getler 1989)
– Inventory investment accelerator (Clark 1917, Kitchin 1923, Lucas 1975, Anderson and Fine 2000)
– Investment irreversibility and intertemporal substitution (Timbergen 1931, Einarsen 1938)
– Underutilized capacity and labor ‘hoarding’ (Petersen and Strongin 1996)
– Technological change (Schumpeter 1911,1939)
– Low barriers to entry, high barriers to exit, commoditization (Weil 1996)
• Supply chains (Simchi-Levi et al. 2003, Lee et al. 1997, Forrester 1961, Towill 1996)
– Order batching
– Inventories. 
– Long lead times.
– Order gaming due to constrained supply
– Price fluctuations (promotions, bulk discounts)
– Strong seasonality or network effects
: applicable to commercial aviation
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Modeling an 
Enterprise of 
Enterprises 
(EoE)
© 2007 Sgouris Sgouridis, Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 15
CA as an EoE (I)
Æ Abstraction of the CA EoE interfaces, primary constituent 
enterprises and non-enterprise stakeholders 
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CA as an EoE (II)
Æ Representation of constituent enterprise and stakeholder value 
functions
Æ Used to evaluate and compare effects of strategic alternatives
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Modeling EoEs
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Strategic areas for reducing cyclicality
• Flexibility in airline operations:
– Fixed vs. variable costs
• Profit sharing and outsourcing
• Leasing
– Aircraft fleet management
• Flexibility in Aircraft Fleet Utilization 
• Aircraft retirement
• Aircraft ordering
– Supply chain visibility
– Demand Forecasting
– Effect of Profitability on Orders
• Airline competitive environment
– Yield management
– Effect of Airline Entry and Exit on Pricing
• Aircraft manufacturers competitive environment
– Aircraft pricing
– Manufacturing 
• Production rate adjustments
• Production costs
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Modeling EoEs
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CA EoE Modeling 
Æ SD Model: captures critical aspects of the EoE
Æ Integration of scenarios, strategies and value functions
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CA EoE SD Model Validation: Airlines
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Historical values (thinner line)
Model data (dotted line)
OP. CAPACITY
DEMAND
Seat-miles
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Historical values
Airline op. 
costs in real $
Model data 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Historical values 
Airline revenues 
in real $ 
Model data 
 
Historical values 
Model data 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Airline 
profit 
margin 
Airline Costs
Airline RevenuesAirline Profit Margins
Airline Capacity and Demand
Æ Visual inspection and statistical analysis indicate matching
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CA EoE SD Model Validation: Manufacturers
Historical values
Model data 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Airline 
orders in 
seat-miles 
 
Historical values
Model data 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Airline 
orders in 
seat-miles 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Manufacturer 
backlog in 
seat-miles MF.A Historical values
Boeing Model data 
Airbus Model data 
MF.B Historical values
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Manufacturer 
backlog in 
seat-miles 
Historical values
Model data 
Airbus and MF.B OrdersBoeing and MF.A Orders
Aircraft Deliveries Aircraft Backlog
Æ Visual inspection and statistical analysis indicate matching
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Modeling EoEs
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Exogenous vs. Endogenous Dynamics
Æ There is cyclical behavior even in the absence of 
exogenous factors
Relative effect on cyclicality of exogenous factors:
1. Fuel (CV : 1.12)
2. GDP (CV : 0.87)
3. External shocks (CV : 0.46)
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From Strategic areas to Strategic 
Alternatives: 2 examples
• Flexibility in airline operations:
– Fixed vs. variable costs
• Profit sharing and outsourcing
• Leasing
– Aircraft fleet management
• Flexibility in Aircraft Fleet Utilization 
• Aircraft retirement
• Aircraft ordering
– Supply chain visibility
– Demand Forecasting
– Effect of Profitability on Orders
• Airline competitive environment
– Yield management
– Effect of Airline Entry and Exit on Pricing
• Aircraft manufacturers competitive 
environment
– Aircraft pricing
– Manufacturing 
• Production rate adjustments
• Production costs
•25% SC Visibility
•50% SC Visibility
•75% SC Visibility
•Slow production rate adjustment
•Faster production rate adjustment
•Just-in-time (JIT) delivery
•Fixed schedule production rate
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Results: Individual Strategic Alternatives 
Performance (average across scenarios)
Æ Control of Capacity is key
NPV 
Change
CV 
change
NPV 
Change
Order CV 
Change
Fare 
Change
LF 
change
75% SC visibility 256.4% 54.0% -45.6% 41.8% 2.6% 13.8%
50% SC visibility 168.7% 47.3% -38.9% 31.5% 2.7% 9.5%
MF fixed prod. Rate 49.6% -23.4% 123.3% N/A -0.3% 2.8%
Slow prod rate change 25.6% -2.6% 63.7% -43.5% -0.8% 1.3%
Slow prod rate change + 25%SC visibility 142.2% 50.5% 4.3% 5.3% 2.2% 7.4%
MF JIT+ lean + 25% SC visibility 90.6% 41.9% -40.2% 25.4% 3.6% 5.2%
Airline Manufacturers Passengers
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Symbiotic Quadrant –
Optimization search for strategic alternative bundles
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00
Airline normalized profit (S1 Baseline = 1.00)
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
r
 
n
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
(
S
1
 
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
=
 
1
.
0
0
)
SLOW PROD. ADJ
FIXED PROD.
SLOW PROD. ADJ + 25% SC VIS.
JIT DELIV.
ÆControl of capacity leads to symbiotic strategies close to the Pareto front
ÆThere are benefits to be gained from bundling strategic alternatives
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Conclusions
Æ Strong endogenous dynamics in commercial aviation structure that fuel 
cyclicality
Æ Non-collusive slowing of production rate adjustment provides strong 
symbiotic benefits to both manufacturers and airlines while passengers are 
not negatively impacted
Æ No synergistic advantage found if MF.A pursues JIT and MF.B maintains its 
slow-to-adapt production strategy (*)
Æ Other interesting strategic alternatives were shown:
• Airline industry consolidation
– In pricing (*)
– In ordering (reducing ‘supply chain discounting’)
• Increasing fleet flexibility (higher level of short term op. leases) (*)
Æ Bundling of alternatives can provide improvements but production control (in 
the extreme) is on the Pareto front
Æ Commercial Aviation as an EoE: a useful perspective
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Thank you for your attention!
Questions?
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Back-up
© 2007 Sgouris Sgouridis, Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 32
Agenda
Overview, Motivation, and Methodology
Research Questions
Modeling Commercial Aviation as an Enterprise of Enterprises
Results and Conclusions
Contributions
Future Work
© 2007 Sgouris Sgouridis, Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 33
Contributions
• Integrating disparate literature strands:
– Extensive coverage of commercial aviation
– Synthesis of the literature on business cycles in economics 
and supply chain
– Modeling approaches for enterprises (Ch. 8)
• Formalizing the Enterprise of Enterprises concept
• Creating an SD model of the CA EoE with duopolist
manufacturer dynamics and separate narrow-, wide- body 
market segments
• Identifying and comparing CA EoE specific symbiotic 
strategic alternatives
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Future Work
• Use agents to model airline behavior and specifically the 
evolution of Airline – Manufacturer partnerships
• Model manufacturer new entrants
• Extend competition on aircraft market beyond only price: 
introduce endogenous dynamic decisions for technological 
aircraft change
• Calibrate the manufacturer module of the model with 
proprietary industry data
• Adapt the EoE view and methodology to other cyclical 
industries and seek generalizations on mechanisms for 
cyclical dynamics
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CA EoE Model Structural View
• Based on and extended H. Weil’s airline industry model (1996)
• Partly developed in collaboration with J. Lin and J. McConnell.
• Implemented using Anylogic
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Competitive Dynamics for S1 (I)
Strategic Alternatives Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B
Production scheduling
JIT delivery * * * * * * *
Slow production rate change * * * * * * *
Quick production rate change
Fixed production schedule
Production costs
Lean manufacturing * * * * * * * * * *
Adaptive production (costs) * *
Industry relations and pricing
Vertical integration (50%) * * * * *
Aggressive Competition * *
Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 Exp 5 Exp 6 Exp 7
Exp1 Exp2 Exp3 Exp4 Exp5 Exp6 Exp7
Airlines
NPV Change 0.2% 3.0% 2.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.1% 1.8%
Coef. Var. Change 21.6% 19.1% 21.7% 25.1% 24.0% 28.6% 12.6%
Mf. A
NPV Change -21.4% 32.5% 48.1% -16.3% -22.4% -5.3% -98.2%
Total order change -2.1% 1.5% 2.7% -0.1% -0.4% 8.8% -1.6%
Order coef. Of Var. change 10.5% 10.6% 9.7% 13.2% 13.4% 19.7% 4.3%
Mf. B
NPV Change -9.1% -3.3% -15.2% -13.2% -11.6% -20.6% -49.1%
Total order change 1.2% 3.8% 2.0% -0.9% -0.3% -5.7% 9.9%
Order coef. Of Var. change 21.3% 18.1% 22.4% 23.0% 23.6% 19.4% 21.1%
Pax
Fare change -0.2% -0.1% 0.0% -0.2% -0.2% -0.1% -1.5%
LF change -0.2% -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -0.3% -0.5% 0.3%
Total Return
Universal owner view 93 108 108 93 92 93 65
Rank
Universal owner view 12 6 5 11 13 10 15
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Competitive Dynamics for S1 (II)
Exp8 Exp9 Exp10 Exp11 Exp12 Exp13 Exp14 Exp15
1.2% 12.4% 55.9% 0.7% 11.1% -0.1% 20.5% 17.7%
22.2% 6.4% -11.4% 3.0% -2.1% 3.2% 2.5% 5.7%
32.0% -51.5% -26.7% 46.8% -10.0% 5.3% 87.1% 119.6%
2.4% -6.8% -44.1% -3.0% -23.0% -1.8% 15.0% 22.6%
18.9% 28.7% -6.1% 1.7% -6.2% 5.2% -11.9% -11.2%
-13.6% -18.0% -21.1% 0.3% -27.3% -5.0% 55.8% 35.5%
-1.2% 3.8% -20.9% 3.2% -0.6% 0.2% 53.0% 49.3%
19.7% 21.8% 9.2% 5.5% 13.8% 4.1% 10.3% 10.1%
0.0% -1.2% -3.1% 0.3% -1.5% 0.2% 0.4% -2.6%
-0.2% 0.9% 3.9% 0.0% 1.3% -0.1% 1.6% 1.4%
104 90 116 111 96 100 145 146
7 14 3 4 9 8 2 1
Airlines
NPV Change
Coef. Var. Change
Mf. A
NPV Change
Total order change
Order coef. Of Var. change
Mf. B
NPV Change
Total order change
Order coef. Of Var. change
Pax
Fare change
LF change
Total Return
Universal owner view
Rank
Universal owner view
Strategic Alternatives Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B Mf. A Mf. B
Production scheduling
JIT delivery * * * *
Slow production rate change * * * * * * *
Quick production rate change * * * *
Fixed production schedule *
Production costs
Lean manufacturing * * * * * * * * * * * * ** **
Adaptive production (costs) * * * * * * * * *
Industry relations and pricing
Vertical integration (15%) * * * * *
Aggressive Competition
Exp 8 Exp 9 Exp 10 Exp 11 Exp 12 Exp 13 Exp 14 Exp 15
© 2007 Sgouris Sgouridis, Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 39
CA Value Chain
Raw Material 
Supply
Subsystem 
Development and 
Production
Aircraft 
Integration and 
Assembly
Aircraft 
Operations
In
fra
st
ru
c t
ur
e 
Pr
ov
is
i o
n
Aircraft Fleet
Ownership and 
Maintenance
C
ap
ita
l 
P
ro
vi
s i
on
Travel
Demand
Satisfaction
Airframe 
Manufacturers Airlines
Leasing
Firms
Public /
Private
Partnerships
Public /
Private
Investors
Travelers 
Shippers
Govt. (Regulatory)
© 2007 Sgouris Sgouridis, Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 40
Airline Costs
Labor
24.2%
Ad & Promotion
0.9%
Maintenance 
Materials
1.3%
Ow nership
12.9%
Utils & Office 
Supplies
0.6%Other
22.2%
Food & Beverage
1.5%
Insurance
0.8%
Fuel
24.7%
Passenger 
Commissions
1.2%
Professional 
Services
6.9%
Landing Fees
1.9%
Communication
1.0%
UNIT COST BY CATEGORY
Cents per Available Seat Mile
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
L
a
b
o
r
F
u
e
l
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
P
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
L
a
n
d
i
n
g
 
F
e
e
s
F
o
o
d
 
&
B
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
M
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
M
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
P
a
s
s
e
n
g
e
r
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
A
d
 
&
P
r
o
m
o
t
i
o
n
U
t
i
l
s
 
&
 
O
f
f
i
c
e
S
u
p
p
l
i
e
s
O
t
h
e
r
© 2007 Sgouris Sgouridis, Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 41
SDM CA EoE
• Based on H.B. Weil’s airline industry model (1996)
• Developed further in collaboration with Jijun and Josh.
• Using Anylogic
Airline industry
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Statistical Tests
 
Theil statistics 
Variable 
Mean 
d 
Mean 
m 
Sqrt 
(MSE) R sq. Um Us Uc 
P(T<=t) 
two-
tail 
Statistically 
significant 
difference 
at 0.05 
Capacity (in trillion 
op. ASM) 2.03 2.03 0.077 0.981 0.001 0.153 0.845 0.986 No 
Demand (in trillion 
RPM) 1.39 1.39 0.061 0.975 0.004 0.007 0.989 0.976 No 
Load factors 0.68 0.68 0.02 0.430 0.019 0.002 0.979 0.718 No 
Airline costs in ($B) 101 98.9 5 0.959 0.172 0.246 0.582 0.730 No 
Airline revenues 103 101.1 5.2 0.949 0.152 0.185 0.663 0.735 No 
Airline profit margins 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.663 0.003 0.000 0.997 0.916 No 
Aircraft orders (in 
trillion ASM) 0.21 0.19 0.067 0.628 0.081 0.095 0.824 0.531 No 
Aircraft backlog (in 
trillion ASM) 0.61 0.63 0.164 0.636 0.019 0.111 0.871 0.771 No 
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Manifestations of Cycles in CA
Load Factors %Yield (c/seat-mile)
Global Airline Data – Data Source ATA (2006)
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Manifestations of Cycles in CA
Airline profitability in $M
Airline profitability in $B Aircraft Seats ordered (‘000)
US Market 
Deregulation
Global Data – Data Sources: ATA (2006), Boeing and Airbus order and 
delivery history
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SD Model Basic Assumptions
• Manufacturers produce equivalent models 
compete on price (can be relaxed)
• There are no manufacturer entrants
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Manufacturer Response to Cycles
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Business Cycles?
World Airlines Operating Results and Orders
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Airframe manufacturers due to their central 
position in the value chain have the potential 
power to enhance system stability.
Objective: 
Symbiotic strategies that can enhance long 
term value by supplanting zero-sum games 
with value adding propositions. They can be 
cooperative but not necessarily so.
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Value Functions: CA as an EoE
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Views of Commercial Aviation
Passengers: ~0.8 Billion
Direct O-D Markets: ~40.000
Major Airlines: ~500
Airframe manufacturers: 2+
Engine manufacturers, 1st tier 
sub-system contractors: ~20
 
U.S. Data (Source: Campbell) Global Data (extrapolation)  
Direct  
Output in $B 
Employees (‘000) Direct  
Output in $B 
Employees (‘000) 
Air transportation 154 691* ~405 ~2000 
Airport services 18 121 ~47 ~345 
Commercial  
Aircraft manufacturing 75 241 ~180 ~640 
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Two enterprise models
Based on: Donaldson and Preston (1995), Kochan and Rubinstein (2000) , Piepenbrock (2005)
© 2007 Sgouris Sgouridis, Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 52
Results: Endogenous Dynamics
Cyclical behavior in the absence of exogenous factors
Effect of exogenous factors in order of importance:
1. Fuel
2. GDP
3. External shocks
Airline Profit Levels (Normalized 1 in 1984)
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Model Key Assumptions
• Equivalent aircraft 
• Freight market represented by 
passengers
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Endogenous dynamics 
mechanisms
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What are the salient causal mechanisms that induce the cyclical 
behavior? CA-specific factors
Macroeconomic cycles, fuel prices, materials, interest ratesExogenous factors
Iraq war I, 9/11, SARS etc.Demand shocks
Deregulation combined with imperfect financing allows multiple entrants.
Subsidies, bankruptcy protections, and national pride policies retain 
players in weak markets
Market regulations
Debt and equity financing available in economic upturns lowers barriers 
to entry BUT dries quickly in downturns increasing risk of price
wars.
Short-term returns can be overemphasized over long-term stability.
Financing volatility
Bounded rationality and strategic optimism create overreaction by 
multiple entrants.
Large number of decision makers.
Decision-making
Scale economies and large investment in upfront R&D incentivize
airframe mfg. to promote their wares aggressively in short term
Low marginal costs for airlines
Industry characteristics
Long lead times for both labor and capital. Irreversibility.Bullwhip in supply 
chains, labor, and 
inventory
Aircraft as large capital investment with limited but adjustable lifetime Reinvestment cycle
Intertemporal
substitution
Noise abatement, stage 2,3,4 aircraftTechnical regulations
Jets, 2-pilot cockpit, fuel efficient designs, product families etc.Disruptive technologies
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Airline Strategic Areas
Decision making. Reducing irrational exuberance.Tempered 
expectations
Number of players. Consolidating capacity will increase market 
power and reduce excessive capacity.
Mergers
Bullwhip reduction. Marginal costs of seats are not zero – holding off 
price wars.
Less aggressive 
revenue management
Bullwhip reduction. Compared to short-term profit-based vs. market-
share based planning.
Long-term profit-based 
planning
Bullwhip reduction.Steady ordering and 
flexible retirement
Bullwhip reduction. Individual airline bottom line boost.Off-cyclical behavior 
(buy low, sell high)
Flexibility. Old amortized aircraft can be retired or parked without 
penalty on fixed costs.
Good mix of ages in 
the fleet
Flexibility. Reduces labor costs during hard times.Profit-sharing 
programs
Flexibility. Reduces fixed capacity costs.Pr
Desired effectStrategic Area
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Airframe Manufacturers Strategic Areas
Bullwhip reduction. Lower capacity costs and higher profit margins.Production and 
development costs (lean 
improvements)
Bullwhip reduction. Capacity effects are felt faster. Capacity inflow is more 
stable.
Flexible production.
Lean mfg. 
Capacity delivery lead 
times.
Cycle dampening. Allow backlogs to build before new production facility is 
established.
Production capacity 
management.
Cycle dampening. Follow the reinvestment cycle.New  aircraft family 
release timing.
Fly-by-the-hour aircraft services. Capacity decisions made with a system wide 
view.
From aircraft manufacturer 
to service provider
Flexibility. Stronger second hand and leasing markets.
Facilitate quick post-manufacture customization (custom color schemes).
Standardize aircraft design
Flexibility. Allowing family orders with specification of size later in time.
Order cancellation policies
Order vetting.
Ordering
Bullwhip reduction. Pro-cyclical pricing vs. stable pricing. 
Need based delivery: Auctioning production slots.
Pricing
Desired EffectStrategic Area
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CA EoE Model Structural View
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CA EoE Model 
Causal Loop View
Airline Fares
Travel
Demand
Airline
Revenues
Airline
Expenses
Airline
Profitability
Desired
Capacity
Planning
Horizon
Aircraft Delivery
Lead Time
+
+
+
-
Flight Service
Quality
Load Factors
- +
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
Order
BacklogProduction
rate
Order rate
Effective
Competitors
Airline Entry
rate
Airline Exit
rate
+
-
Airline Target
Profitability
-
+
-
Active
CapacityRetirement
Rate
Operational
Capacity
Fleet
Utilization
Demand
Forecast
+
-
+
Aircraft
Ownership Cost
Volatility of
Production Rate
Aircraft
Production Costs
+
+
Production rate
change
+
+
?
B
Market
saturation
B
Forecast
Error 
Aircraft Price
Competitor
Aircraft Price
Aircraft Market
Share
-+
+
+
B
Service
deterioration
+
B
Continously changing
production reduces product
attractiveness
-
-
+
+-
+
Aircraft
Profitabiltiy +
-
+
Fixed Costs
Variable
Costs
+
+
+
+
-
Lean Initiatives Lean effortsCompl
acency
-+
-
© 2007 Sgouris Sgouridis, Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 60
Two conceptual ways to dampen the CA EoE based 
on Manufacturer Constituents
JIT Delivery:
+ No requirement for collusion
+ Increasing barriers to entry
-Depends on technical feasibility
-Provides comparatively less ROIC
Decoupling Capacity:
+ No requirement for collusion
+ Provides very high ROIC
- Attracts entrants
- Depending on implementation, may increase fares
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Results: Symbiotic Quadrants
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Definitions
EoE is a conceptual abstraction of an enterprise 
ecosystem
Strategic alternative is a specified action
Symbiotic strategic alternative is an action that 
improves total system performance by 
(a) increasing the probability of survival for a 
majority of the EoE constituents; and 
(b) without significantly compromising the long-
term value delivered to any single constituent 
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Systems and Enterprises
Layers of systems (based on Hitchins 1994):
Layer 5 - Socio-economic. Principal lever of control is regulation.
Layer 4 - Industry. Complete and competitive supply chains.
Layer 3 - Business. Controlled optimization independent of 
competitor/partner performance.
Layer 2 - Project. The making of complex artifacts.
Layer 1 - Product. The making of tangible artifacts.
Socio- 
technical 
Focus of: 
OR 
SE 
SA 
EoE 
C
o
m
p
l
e
x
i
t
y
 
Technical/ 
Mechanical
Traditional 
Engineering SoS 
  Unitary Pluralist 
  Authority 
 Classification based on Jackson and Keys (1984)
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From SoS to Enterprise of Enterprises
“organizations are purposeful systems which contain purposeful parts and 
which are themselves part of larger purposeful systems. 
Hence organizations have responsibilities to their own purposes, to the 
purposes of their parts, and to the purposes of the larger systems of which 
they are part.” (Jackson and Keys 1984)
Characteristics of EoEs (based on SoS -- Maier 1998, Sage and Cuppan 2001):
• Operational Independence of the Constituent enterprises
• Managerial Independence of the Constituent enterprises
• Evolutionary Development
• Emergent Behavior
• Diversity of Interfaces
Distinct value functions of constituents from emergent global value
No obvious architect or point of leverage
Large system inertia
Loose coupling at interfaces 
(tighter coupling EoEÆ Extended Enterprise (Nightingale 2004) )
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Loose coupling vs. Tight coupling
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Scenarios
• S1: Global Village
• S2: Islands of 
Sufficiency
• S3: Growth and 
overshoot
